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WORLD WIDE PHOTOS
THE U. S. INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA
By Courtland Cox
The internal struggle in Angola has a
relatively long history. The long standing
differences between the leaders of the
National Front for the Liberation of Angola
(FNLA) and the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola (MPLA) are both
ideological and personal. As far back as
1964, the Organization of African Unity
(OAU) tried to mediate the differences
between the two factions, but gave up in
1966 without success.
Given the long and bitter ideological
and personality differences between
NFLA head Holden Roberto and MPLA
head Agostinho Neto, it should not be too
surprising to see them opposing each
other in the Angolan conflict.
The American Role
The United States played a dual role in
Angola from 1961 to 1969. It supplied
Portugal's military needs for the colonial
wars in Africa; at the same time, hedged
its bets in Angola .by supporting FNLA
with funds for political and logistical
purposes.
Ostensibly, the United States sold
millions of dollars in arms- including
bombs, napalm, munitions-to Portugal
for NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion) purposes. However, during hearings
by Congressman Charles Diggs (0-
Mich.) in March, 1973, it was revealed
that the United States had indeed con-
tributed to the prosecution of the counter-
insurgency warfare in Angola, Mozam-
bique and Guinea-Bissau.
Also, the United States subsidized-at
a much reduced level-Holden Roberto's
FNLA through Zaire and CIA conduits
from 1961 to 1969. (New York Times,
September 23, 1975). But, in 1969, the
Nixon administration decided to end the
covert aid program to FNLA as a part of
policy decision to improve relations with
the white regimes in Southern Africa.
(According to State Department aides at
a hearing before the Subcommittee on
Africa, Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, February 5, 1976, the CIA kept
Roberto on the payroll [reportedly at a
sum of $10,000 annually] as an intelli-
gence source).
In January, 1975, when it became clear
that Angola would receive its independ-
ence, this time the Ford administration
turned Roberto back on by granting him a
surn of $300,000. According to testimony
by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
before the Senate Subcommittee on
Africa, January 29, 1976, the funds were
given to Roberto for the purchase of
supplies and bicycles.
In the early spring of 1975, President
Gerald Ford made the decision to also
fund the National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola [UNITAl, which
was founded in 1966 by Jonas Savimbi.
The 40 Committee-a body in the Execu-
tive branch that approves large scale
covert operations (chaired by Kissinger),
approved $300,000 in secret subsidies
for UNITA. Both President Ford and Sec-
retary Kissinger were aware that bring ing
UNITA to the American side constituted
a major step-close to a commitment that
the United States would not allow MPLA
to control Angola.
An official of the Ford administration
told John Marks, an associate at the
Center for National Security Studies,
that Kissinger pushed hard for increased
CIA intervention. "Henry wanted to be
told why we should intervene," said the
official, "not why not." (Intelligence
Report, Vol. 1, No.1, December 1975).
Many within the State Department were
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Before Independence-MPLA's Agostinho Neto,
(left) who now heads the Government of the People's
Republic of Angola, is seen here with FNLA's Holden
Roberto (center) and UNITA's Jonas Savimbi during
January 1975 unity talks in Mombasa, Kenya.
"European" - the ru lers; 5
"African"-minimally, 95 percent of
the population of Angola, oppressed,
exploited, and angry.
In 1954, the Bakongo tribe of Northern
Angola chose Holden Roberto as its new
chief in a secession quarrel that was tied
up with reform issues and Catholic-Prot-
estant religious conflict. What Roberto
stood for at this point was separation of
the Bakongo from Angola, and tribal self-
determination through the reestablishment
of the old "Bakongo Empire" of the 15th
Century, which stretched between Angola
and what is now Zaire. The organization
formed for this purpose was UPNA-the
Popular Union of Northern Angola.
During this same period, men like
Agostinho Neto, Marcelino Dos Santos,
and Amilcar Cabral, all "assimilado"
from Portugal's African colonies, were
returning to Africa after university educa-
tion and political involvement in. the
Portuguese left.
Neto, who returned to Luanda, had
already been jailed in Portugal for his
militant anti-fascist poetry. As a gynecolo-
gist, he set up practice in Luanda's slums,
but also maintained political commitment,
becoming involved in the formation of the
MPLA-the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola- in 1956. This move-
ment at this time was primarily urban-
based and different from UPNA in its
non-tribal orientation as well as in its
leadership which, while "nationalist," was
also pol itically leftwing - borrowing much,
though not blindly, from Marx and Lenin.
At the persuasion of a number of African
leaders attend ing the 1958 All African
.Peoples Conference in Ghana, Roberto
dropped the "N" from UPNA and rede-
fined the movement as a movement for
national liberation. UPA, however, never
lost its tribal image or its hostility to the
"urban elites" of MPLA. In political terms
this translated into an anti-communist
hostility-communism being the rather
inaccurate view by UPA of MPLA's objec-
tives. Though ill-defined politically, UPA's 1
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opposed to the United States interven-
tion in Angola.
Nevertheless, America and its Euro-
pean allies provided arms to FNLA and
UNITA. Official sources indicate that the
United States alone spent $32 million for
arms in Angola during 1975. A closer
figure to the truth would be between $125
and $150 million. The White House has
suppressed the House Intelligence Com-
mittee report which points out that the
Ford administration undervalued arms
sent to Angola from four to ten times
their actual value. (New York Times,
January 20,1976).
Before the FNLA military
demise, U. S. transport planes
C-141 and C-130, flying on
behalf of the CIA, would land
regularly in Kinshasa, Zaire,
disgorging tons of military
supplies, including rifles,
machine guns, light artillery,
rocket launchers and muni-
tions; these in turn were
flown to the Angolan town of
Ambriz by smaller planes. In
addition to the arms and
munitions, the United
States flew artillery spotter
planes, piloted by Americans,
into the Angolan battle
zones. Mercenaries were
either trained or paid for
with funds from the United
States.
Before the FNLA military demise, U.S.
transport planes C-141 and C-130, flying
on behalf of the CIA, would land regularly
in Kinshasa, Zaire, disgorging tons of
military supplies, including rifles,
machine guns, light arti Ilery, rocket
launchers and munitions; these fn turn
were flown to the Angolan town of
Ambriz by smaller planes. In addition to
the arms and munitions, the United States
flew artillery spotter planes, piloted by
Americans, into the Angolan battle zones.
Mercenaries were either trained or paid
for with funds from the United States.
Despite the opulent airlift of French,
Belgian, German and American arms,
FNLA lost ground steadily. By the end
of September, 1975, FNLAsuffered major
military defeats. On the other hand,MPLA
controlled the Angolan capital of Luanda,
all the major ports, both ends of the stra-
tegic Benguela railway and, most impor-
tantly, 12 of Angola's 16 provinces. FNLA
had been forced back into the two north-
ern provinces of Uige and Zaire, and in
early October, 1975, was being pressed
even there.
In the southern part of Angola, FNLA
had formed an uneasy alliance with
UNITA, which at that time controlled the
provinces of Huambo and Bie. UNITAhad
joined the fighting with reluctance in
August and recruited, along with' FNLA,
foreign mercenaries to stiffen resistance
against MPLA forces.
The South African Offensive
In the last week of October, 1975, the
military situation in Angola drastically
changed. According to wire service
reports, unidentified forces-South Afri-
can troops-moved into Angola from
Namibia (South West Africa). The South
African troops took Pereira de Eca, a
major road junction just north of the
border.
Sa da Banderia, the capital of Huila
province, some 150 miles to the north-
west, fell two days later. Mocamedes, a
port just to the west of Sa da Banderia,
was occupied on October 20. On the
The United States, it would
seem, perceives itself as the
number one power in the
world and, in pursuit of its
superpower status, has
engaged in a form of perma-
nent war. Richard Barnet, in
his book Roots of War,
points out that since' 1945
the United States has con-
ducted a major military
campaign in paramilitary CIA
operations in a former
colonial or dependent
country in Africa, Asia,
Middle East, Latin America,
South America and Europe
on an average of once every
18 months.
morning of November 2, FNLAand UNITA
forces-led by South Africans- attacked
Benguela, which is less than 300 miles to
the north of Mocamedes. By November
11, in less than three weeks, MPLA had
lost control of most of the coast of Angola
and all of the southern provinces. The
South Africa-United States-UNITA-FNLA
military objective of pushing the MPLA
back from most of the provinces in south-
ern Angola was accomplished. On
November 11, MPLA had control of only
6 of 16 provinces, and its claim to rule
Angola as the sole political entity was
effectively discredited.
While the South Africa-United States
offensive succeeded militarily, it was a
disaster politically. Many African nations
that had adhered to the OAU's call for a
government of national unity sided with
MPLA. Nigeria, Tanzania, Ghana and
others recognized the government of the
People's Republic of Angola as a direct
result of the South African offensive. Fora
time it seemed that most of Africa would
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join in a condemnation of South Africa at
the OAU summit in Addis Ababa, January
10-12, 1976.To prevent a political rebuke
of United States-South Africa policy in
Angola, President Ford sent Assistant
Secretary of State William Schaufele, Jr.,
to confer with five African heads of state.
Personal messages from the President
were sent to 38 other African heads of
state.
The OAU meeting stalled in a 22-22
deadlock, with Uganda and Ethopia
abstaining.
Since the OAU conference, the military
situation has turned again dramatically
in MPLA's favor. FNLA has been made
ineffective as a military force, UNITA is in
retreat and South Africa has pulled back
-or was pushed back-by a combined
Cuban-MPLA military force.
Why did the United States intervene
covertly in Angola?
The United States, it would seem, per-
ceives itself as the number one power in
the world and, in pursuit of its super-
power status, has engaged in a form of
permanent war. Richard Barnet, in his
book Roots of War, points out that since
1945 the United States has conducted a
major military campaign in paramilitary
CIA operations in a former colonial or
dependent country in Africa, Asia, Middle
East, Latin America, South America and
Europe on an average of once every 18
months.
In all of the above campaigns, the
United States, according to former U.S.
Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen, had "no
sinister design, no hidden purpose, cer-
tainly no imperialist ambitions in our
policy, but simply moved to answer a
challenge."
Why did the United States intervene
covertly in Southern Africa?
The Portuguese governrnent, after the
April 25, 1974 coup, decided to decol-
onize in Africa. Some United States for-
eign policy planners and national
security experts feared the stability of
Southern Africa would be threatened.
.Arnerican policy, as outlined in the 1970
National Security Study Mernorandurn
No. 39, was based on the assurnption
that the white governrnents of Southern
Africa were going to rnaintain their power
in the area. The United States, therefore,
could depend on South Africa, the Por-
tuguese governrnent, and the Ian Smith
regime in Rhodesia to maintain stability
in the area.
The United States governrnent was not
overjoyed when Portugal gave in to the
demands of Frelimo to govern Mozam-
bique. Frelimo was socialist, it had re-
ceived substantial military aid from China
and the Soviet Union in its struggle for
independence. Mozarnbique could also
serve as a rear base for African militants
in South Africa. To prevent Frelirno frorn
heading the government of Mozambique,
the CIA tried to cause civil strife by giving
money and arms to a small group called
Ceremo. But Frelimo proved too strong
and popular; the CIA's covert operation
failed. Both the United States and South
Africa reluctantly accepted a Frelimo
government in Mozambique, well aware
that Mozarnbique's economy was deeply
and unavoidably tied to South Africa's
economy.
A Long Struggle
On the other coast of Southern Africa, the
Angolan people achieved independence
after a 14-year liberation struggle. During
the independence struggle, the move-
ments received arrns and monetary sup-
port from either the Soviet Union or China.
SWAPO (South West Africa People's
Organization) received support from both
UNITA and MPLA in the struggle for the
liberation of Namibia from South African
rule. However, the Angolan economy,
unlike that of Mozambique's, was not so
heavi Iy dependent on the South African
economy.
The trend in Southern Africa, after the
Portuguese coup, was toward independ-
ence and liberation. South Africa, if the
trend continued, would be isolated and 41
vulnerable. To retard the forces of Iibera-
tion, a four part strategy was advanced.
First, South Africa would not take an overt
belligerent stance toward Mozambique;
instead South Africa would try to strangle
Mozambique econornically. Second,
Rhodesia should be given majority rule
under a responsible (to South Africa)
Black government, so as to forestall
revolutionary armed struggle. Third, South
Africa would try to end its diplomatic
isolation through its detente efforts. The
South Africans, through loans and other
inducements, would split Africa's hostil-
ity to its apartheid regime. Finally, South
Africa and its allies wanted to be certain
that only a governrnent favorable to them
would corne to power in Angola. The gov-
ernment of Angola had to be approved by
both President Mobutu of Zaire and
PrernierVorster of South Africa. FNLAmet
the qualifications. During Angola's pre-
independence transition period, the
United States gave covert aid and arms'
to FNLA so that it might have overwhelrn-
ing political and military advantage.
Unlike most of Africa,
Angola's independence came
during a state of civil strife.
In the 1960s, most of the
decolonization process in
Africa was peaceful. Occa-
sionally, when hostilities
occurred, the fighting was
between the former European
colonial power and the
African nationalists. The
lines were sharp, and the
choices were clear.
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